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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 1973, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc. determined that over
the past 7 years, it had paid $6,380,587.40 in Medicare' funds to a
Miami Beach hospital for services Blue Cross now found medically
unnecessary. It informed the hospital that it would begin withhold-
ing current payments to offset the error.'
In 1969, Aetna Life and Casualty, determining that it had over-
paid a New York State nursing facility at least $96,000 over the past
2 years, discontinued all further payments, thereby driving the fa-
cility out of business. :'
* Member, University of Miami Law Review
1. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq. (Supp. I1, 1973). The Act's functions are
explained in section II infra.
2. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975).
3. Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971).
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A Medicare carrier in Louisiana changed its method of figuring
reimbursable hospital costs ' and attempted to impose that method
on a hospital retroactively for the preceding 4 years by claiming a
resulting overpayment of $260,416.
A doctor specializing in internal medicine was informed by his
carrier that claims paid to him in the past had been reopened and
that he presently owed thousands of dollars to Medicare. The re-
opening had revealed that many of his claims represented unneces-
sary use of his services.7
A New York hospital discovered that it had been underpaid'
$394,392 by a Medicare intermediary for the past 2 years. The inter-
mediary admitted the error but refused to pay. When sued, the
intermediary and representatives of the Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare (HEW), functioning now in an unfamiliar role,
pleaded that the plaintiff should not prevail because the govern-
ment would suffer great hardship if its payment determinations
were held to be subject to reopening' and unlimited retroactive ad-
justment."'
These examples of attempted recovery of alleged overpayments
and the attempt to recoup an underpayment illustrate the severe
unforeseen difficulties facing doctors and hospitals which depend on
payment from the Medicare program. Although these attempted
retroactive recoveries comprise only part of the health care indus-
try's difficulties with Medicare, they are extremely significant in
dollar amount, and they illuminate two other major Medicare con-
troversies: determining reasonable cost" and determining the exist-
ence of medical necessity, a question of coverage.'
Retroactive recovery also spotlights the nature of the relation-
ship between the Medicare establishment and the health care in-
dustry, a relationship originally largely devoid of the due process
requirements of proper notice and impartial administrative agency
4. See text section 11 and note 19 infra for a discussion of carriers.
5. See note 21 infra for a discussion of cost formulas.
6. Columbia Heights Nursing Home & Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 380 F. Supp. 1066
(M.). La. 1974).
7. Szekely v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. See note 21 infra for an explanation of underpayments.
9. See note 22 infra for an explanation of reopenings.
10. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973).
11. See note 21 infra.
12. See note 25 infra.
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adjudication. In each instance mentioned above, HEW' and its
carriers asserted that the hospitals and nursing facilities had no
right to judicial review of the carriers' unilateral recovery actions or,
in the case of the New York Hospital, to review of the carrier's
refusal to retroactively adjust an underpayment. In these cases and
others, HEW and its carriers asserted that the hospitals did not
even have a right to a formal agency hearing.
Court decisions, in part a product of the vigorous opposition of
individual doctors and hospitals, have modified that relationship to
a significant degree. They have forced and encouraged both legisla-
tive and administrative implementation of due process protections,
at least with respect to most cost overpayment disputes. To a cer-
tain extent, these protections extend even into coverage determina-
tions, but there is much that must yet be done to ensure doctors and
hospitals the same due process protections in coverage disputes they
now enjoy when faced with a potential cost overpayment action.
Because an administrative agency not only administers govern-
ment programs, but also adjudicates disputes between itself as
administrator and the persons affected by its programs, due process
problems are inherent in the agency's structure. As the result of an
agency's apparently unavoidable dual role as judge and interested
party in the disputes before it, these due process problems generally
will not be remedied by agency personnel left to their own devices.
For this reason legislative safeguards and disinterested judicial re-
view of agency action are vital.
An analysis focusing on the problem of attempted large scale
recoupments may facilitate the presentation in this article of argu-
ments available to hospitals and doctors for countering arbitrary
and unfair acts of Medicare administrators,14 particularly when cov-
erage questions are involved.
II. THE PURPOSE AND OPERATION OF THE MEDICARE PROGRAM
A brief general description of the Medicare program's purpose
and operation is a necessary introduction to a discussion of overpay-
13. See discussion in section 1I infra of the role of HEW in administering the Medicare
program.
14. Of course, HEW has a valid interest (which is beyond the scope of this comment) in
stopping waste in the health care industry. But HEW's action to control waste must meet
the requirements of due process, or it risks destroying both the sound as well as the wasteful
portions of the health care industry.
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ment conflicts. Basically, the purpose of the Health Insurance for
the Aged Act (Medicare Act) is to provide payment of inpatient and
outpatient medical expenses incurred as a result of illness or injury
by persons over 65 years of age eligible for Social Security retirement
benefits. 5 The Act provides payment under part A for inpatient
confinement in hospitals and "skilled nursing facilities" and allows
benefits under part B for the services of physicians, " physical thera-
pists, and other persons. 7 The part A institutions are termed "pro-
viders"'" by the Act. HEW and its subordinate divisions, the Social
Security Administration and the Bureau of Health Insurance, are
responsible for administering the Medicare program.
Both providers and physicians can elect to submit their re-
quests for Medicare payments to carriers"0 (private insurance com-
panies such as Aetna Life and Casualty or prepayment plans like
Blue Cross - Blue Shield) rather than to present claims directly to
HEW. Transactions with carriers are the rule, rather than the ex-
ception, because carriers' offices are in closer geographical proxim-
ity to providers and physicians and because carriers usually are able
to make payments more quickly than would HEW.
Part A payment methods differ from those prescribed in part
B. Part A reimbursement is made directly to the provider for its
reasonable costs of providing services to Medicare patients termed
"eligible individuals" under the Act.2" A provider's reasonable
15. S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., ist Sess. printed in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEWS at
1943 (1965).
16. Medicare Act § 1861(r), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(r) (Supp. III, 1973) defines physician as
a licensed M.D. or D.O., or, under certain circumstances, a dentist, podiatrist, optometrist
or chiropractor.
17. Persons other than physicians who directly supply services to eligible individuals
under part B include physical therapists, X-ray technicians, suppliers of durable medical
equipment and prosthetic devices, ambulance operators, and operators of independent labo-
ratories meeting certain conditions. See Medicare Act § 1861(s), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s) (Supp.
Ill. 1973).
18. Medicare Act § 1861(u), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (Supp. III, 1973) defines provider of
seruice.s as a hospital, skilled nursing facility, or home health agency.
19. Medicare Act §§ 1816, 1842, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395u (Supp. III, 1973). Section
1395u(f) defines carrier as
a voluntary association, corporation, partnership, or other nongovernmental or-
ganization which is lawfully engaged in providing, paying for, or reimbursing the
cost of, health services under group insurance policies or contracts, medical or
hospital service agreements, membership or subscription contracts, or similar
group arrangements, in consideration of premiums or other periodic charges paya-
ble to the carrier . ...
20. Medicare Act §§ 1811, 1836, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395o (Supp. III, 1973), defines
eli.gibh, individuals as those 65 years of age and older receiving Social Security retirement
[Vol. 30:427
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costs2 are estimated at the beginning of its fiscal year and are
usually paid in 12 or 24 equally spaced allotments over the year.
At the end of a year, a cost report is submitted by the provider to
the carrier and a "determination" is made by the carrier of the
reasonable costs incurred for that year. Once the determination is
made, the cost payments are increased or decreased in order to
reconcile the past year's payments with the actual costs incurred. 22
A part B physician is reimbursed directly only if he obtains an
assignment of benefits from the individual patient;23 otherwise, the
benefits, or those under 65 receiving Social Security total disability benefits.
21. The Medicare Act § 1861(v), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v) (Supp. III, 1973) defines
reasonable cost as:
ITihe cost actually incurred, excluding therefrom any part of incurred cost found
to be unnecessary in the efficient delivery of needed health services, and shall be
determined in accordance with regulations establishing the method or methods
to he used, and the items to be included, in determining such costs for various
types or classes of institutions, agencies and services ....
20 C.F.R. §§ 405.401 -.488 (1974) establish the criteria for determining reasonable cost
and provide in pertinent part:
All necessary and proper expenses of an institution in the production of services,
including normal standby costs, are recognized. Furthermore, the share of the
total institutional cost that is borne by the [Medicarel program is related to the
care furnished IMedicarel beneficiaries so that no part of their cost would need
to be borne by other patients.
Id. at § 405.402(a).
As formulated herein, the principles give recognition to such factors as deprecia-
tion, interest, bad debts, educational costs, compensation of owners, and an al-
lowance for a reasonable return on equity capital of proprietary facilities.
Id. at § 405.402(c). It can be seen that many factors are included in a single yearly cost
determination. The provider must use a Medicare-approved cost accounting method, is reim-
bursed only for certain approved items and must purchase supplies and services at competi-
tive market rates. Costs can be underpaid or overpaid by the misapplication by the carrier
of any of the above-mentioned factors to the provider's specific situation.
22. The Medicare Act § 1861(v), 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. III, 1973) provides
that regulations shall:
provide for the making of suitable retroactive corrective adjustments where, for a
provider of services for any fiscal period, the aggregate reimbursement produced
by the methods of determining costs proves to be either inadequate or excessive
(emphasis added).
Note the distinction between (1) adjustment payments from year to year to reconcile esti-
mated advance payments with actual costs incurred and (2) reopening closed determinations
and reports from several years past and finding that the determinations themselves were
made incorrectly. It is the latter situation which is the subject of cost overpayment controver-
sies. Whether section 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) provides authority for reopenings has been the sub-
ject of heated judicial debate.
23. By signing the appropriate section of a Medicare part B claim form, the patient may
assign to his physician his right to receive benefits. A physician accepting such an assignment
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
patient receives the benefit. Part B payments are made for reason-
able fees rather than for the costs the doctors actually incur."
Both part A providers and part B doctors are subject to a provi-
sion of the Act which directs that services which are not medically
"necessary" for the diagnosis or treatment of disease or injury are
not "covered" services for which payment can be made.2"
I. RETROACTIVE RECOVERY OF COST OVERPAYMENTS
Of the two main problem areas in Medicare law-cost determi-
nations and coverage determinations-the cost area has become the
more settled. Recent legislation in that area has provided greatly
improved due process protection and has clarified obscurities in the
old law, simplifying a court's task of statutory construction.
The cost area still merits attention, however. The first impor-
tant judicial confrontations between the Medicare bureaucracy, and
the health industry, involving significant sums of money in dispute,
were concentrated in the cost area. Cases concerning coverage dis-
putes assume an understanding of the due process and statutory
construction aspects of these early cost cases, and refer to the cost
cases as authorities on these points.
Then too, the recent quiescence in the cost area is only relative;
statutory and administrative problems still remain unresolved. Fur-
thermore, the lessons learned in studying the cost area can serve as
guidelines in solving the significant problems which exist in the
coverage arena.
A. Judicial Developments
Recent court decisions have generally allowed reopenings of
hinds himself hot to collect from the patient any portion of his fee disallowed by Medicare.
42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(B)(ii) (Supp. III, 1973). For this reason, physicians accept assign-
ments only from uncreditworthy patients.
24. A doctor may, for example, set a fee of $4.00 for an office diagnostic procedure which
actually costs him $3.28 to perform. If this $4.00 is within the bounds of what other doctors
in the area charge for the same procedure, it will be deemed a reasonable fee.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (Supp. III, 1973). There is a distinction between (1) reasona-
ble costs and (2) expenses or services not covered because they are not medically necessary.
Initial cost determinations assume that the patient needs the services provided (e.g., 2 weeks
in the hospital, 15 electrocardiagrams and a heart catheterization). The inquiry is then
directed to whether these services have been provided as economically as possible. Initial
coverage (medical necessity) determinations question whether the patient actually needed
the services provided, or whether some or all of the tests and treatments he received were
unnecessary.
[Vol. 30:427
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cost reports, holding that the Medicare Act does not bar judicial
review of reopenings and attempted recoveries and that HEW must
accord due process to providers.
1. STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO REOPEN COST DETERMINATIONS
The sections of the Act to which the courts have looked for
HEW's authority to reopen past cost report determinations are ob-
scurely worded,2" giving rise to differing judicial interpretations. A
Louisana district court in Columbia Heights Nursing Home &
Hospital, Inc. v. Weinberger,27 found that 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)
(A)(ii) (Supp. III, 1973)21 provides no "clear" statutory authority
for reopening past yearly cost determinations, presumably because
the section does not so state specifically. Since old reports could
not be reopened, the overpayment alleged by the Secretary could
not be recouped from the provider.29
In Wilson Clinic & Hospital, Inc. v. Blue Cross,30 however, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit did find that the Medicare
Act contains at least implied statutory authority for reopening pre-
vious years' cost determinations' and that the HEW regulation, 2
which expressly permits reopenings of old cost determinations is
properly grounded in the Act.
The plaintiff hospital in Kingsbrooh Jewish Medical Center v.
Richardson,:': like the hospital in Columbia, was provided by its
carrier with a cost accounting method"4 which the carrier later de-
cided produced incorrect results. Yet, unlike the situation in
26. The section of the Act most germane to the issue of reopenings is section 1861(v), 42
U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. III, 1973), set out in note 22 supra.
27. 380 F. Supp. 1066 (M.D. La. 1974).
28. See note 22 supra.
29. See additional discussion of the Columbia case, section III, A, 2 infra.
30. 494 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1974).
31. The court stated:
Reopenings are contemplated generally by the Act. To begin with, it im-
pliedly, if not expressly, envisages the canvassing of all payments to a provider.
See: 142 U.S.C.I § 1395g; § 1395f(b); § 1395h(a)(2)(B). Obviously, this tutelage
embraces the power and duty to reopen settlements.
Moreover, the Secretary is instructed to issue regulations for the making of
"suitable retroactive corrective adjustments" whenever the indemnity of the
provider appears "inadequate or excessive." 142 U.S.C.1 § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. at 52.
32. 20 C.F.R. § 405.499(g)(1974), then in effect, has been superseded by 20 C.F.R. § 405.
1885 (1975).
33. 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973).
34. See note 21 supra.
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Columbia, this method underpaid Kingsbrook, the provider. When
the hospital demanded reimbursement, HEW, now owing funds in-
stead of being owed, took the position that the new, more accurate,
cost accounting method could be applied only prospectively. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that section 1395
x(v) (1):1 was express statutory authority for reopening and readjust-
ing past yearly cost reports,3t including those instances in which
HEW would be required to reimburse the provider for previous un-
derpayments. The court ordered the Secretary to reimburse Kings-
brook and, if necessary, to promulgate regulations under which
reimbursement could be accomplished.
Section 1395hh of the Act,37 a general authorization enabling
the Secretary to promulgate necessary regulations, which could in-
clude those governing reopening, further shows that section
1395x(v)(1) is as clear and express an authority for reopening cost
reports as the Second Circuit stated. In any event, absent a specific
statutory prohibition, the government retains its common law right
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp.
III, 1973).
36. The wording of section 1395x(v)(1) which the Kingsbrook court holds is "plain"
authority for reopenings is set out in note 22 supra. It is the same wording construed by the
courts in Columbia and Wilson Clinic. The Kingsbrook court reasoned as follows:
[Tihe Medicare Act incorporates a twofold adjustment process: (1) to rectify
errors produced by the interim payment procedure; (2) to correct flaws in the
aggregate reimbursement to which a provider is entitled due to an erroneous
method of determining reimbursable cost ...
This distinction between methods of payment and methods of determining costs
is highlighted by the drafters' use of different sections of the Act, section 1395g
and section 1395x(v)(1) respectively, to describe each. Section 1395g authorizes
periodic reimbursement "prior to audit or settlement by the General Accounting
Office . . . with necessary adjustments on account of previously made overpay-
ments or underpayments .. " This statutory language delineating an interim
payment procedure, necessarily based on cost estimates, must be contrasted with
the reference in section 1395x(v)(1) to "methods of determining costs" to be
established for calculation of the annual and, if accurate, final measure of reim-
bursable costs incurred by the provider. With this descriptive duality in mind,
we believe that the corrective adjustments contemplated under section 1395g,
required to remedy provider errors revealed after audit, are of a kind different
from the corrective adjustments mandated by section 1395x(v)(1), designed to
rectify mistakes made by HEW in formulating a particular method of determin-
ing cost. (Footnotes omitted).
486 F.2d at 669-70.
:7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh (Supp. III, 1973). "The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the administration of the insurance programs under this
subchapter."
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to recover moneys mistakenly paid. :" No court has ever held that the
Medicare Act abrogates the government's common law right to re-
cover cost overpayments. 5
In summary, the prevailing view is that cost reports can be
reopened upon request under either section 1395x(v)(1)(A) (ii) or the
common law rule.
2. MEDICARE'S DUE PROCESS DEFICIENCIES
Since the courts generally agree that cost reports may be re-
opened, and these reopenings may involve tens or hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars, standards are needed to prevent HEW and its
carriers from abusing the reopening process.") In seeking to recoup
their money, HEW and its carriers in the past have demonstrated
gross disregard for the constitutionally protected due process rights4
of the providers. Before May 1972 there were no regulations provid-
ing for even informal hearings on reopenings. The plaintiff in Coral
Gables Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Richardson,42 had 50 percent of
its current payments suspended by Aetna Life and Casualty to en-
able the insurance company to recoup alleged overpayments found
when old yearly cost reports were reopened. Although the Aetna
personnel who made the redeterminations held informal face-to-
face conferences with the nursing home, no administrative hearing
was provided either before or after the suspension of payments. The
district court in Coral Gables held that, on these facts, due process
demanded at least a post-suspension hearing. The court ordered the
Secretary to hold the hearing and, if necessary, to promulgate regu-
38. Wilson Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross, 494 F.2d 50, 52 (4th Cir. 1974), citing
Wisconsin Central R.R. v. United States, 164 U.S. 190, 212 (1896). The policy behind this
right is that themoney in dispute belongs to the people and can always be recovered by the
government for them.
39. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975), holds that the
Act does not prohibit recoveries of coverage overpayments. See text, section IV, A, 1 infra.
40. Since May 1972, HEW regulations have barred cost report reopenings made more
than 3 years after the date of original determination. 20 C.F.R. § 405.499(g) (1974), as
amended, 20 C.F.R. § 405.1885 (1975).
41. The importance of due process is self-evident. It inhibits arbitrary action and totali-
tarianism. Its vital elements include notice of the action being taken and of the reasons for
it, as well as the opportunity to be heard, to defend against the action, to answer charges
and to present and refute evidence before an impartial adjudicator, who creates an accurate
record of the adjudication which is used if an appeal from the hearing decision is desired to
be taken. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT, chs. 7 & 8 (3d ed. 1972).
42. 340 F. Supp. 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
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lations to put impartial hearing procedures into effect. 3
Although regulations outlining hearing procedures were
promptly adopted," due process deficiencies still existed. The regu-
lations provided that neither the carrier nor HEW could be made
parties to the hearing so that final orders in favor of the provider
were not binding on HEW or the carrier. 5 In addition, these regula-
tions did not provide for judicial review of hearing decisions.
On at least three occasions, it appears that even the minimal
due process requirements of the regulations were not met by the
carriers involved, although the courts did not reach the merits of
these contentions: cross examination of witnesses was not permit-
ted;" a hearing officer was accused of being a biased participant in
a reopening determination;"7 and a carrier clearly disregarded the
command of regulation 405.999g(e)' that no cost reports were to be
regained more than 3 years after the reports had been approved."
Furthermore, another violation of procedural due process occurred
when one of HEW's carriers approved a cost accounting system,
instructed a provider to use it, and later, summarily suspended
present payments to recoup the overpayments the system had alleg-
edly been producing."' In response to this abuse, the court in
Columbia Heights Nursing Home & Hospital, Inc. v. Weinberger,"
announced the sound rule that where a provider has relied to its
detriment on the express representations of a carrier, the carrier and
HEW will be estopped from recovery unless the carrier can show
clear, unambiguous statutory authorization of its right to recover.2
43. The court indicated that the procedure must give the provider detailed written notice
of the redeterminations made as a result of the reopening as well as notice of a right to a
hearing. At the hearing, the plaintiff was to be permitted to introduce evidence and to cross-
examine the intermediary personnel who had reopened his old cost reports. The decision-
maker at the hearing was to be impartial and unassociated with the reopening decision;
moreover, he was required to state the reasons for his decision and to indicate the evidence
on which he relied. Id. at 651.
44. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.490-99 (1974), as amended, 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1801-.1889 (1975).
45. St. Jude Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 3 CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
(m-E ' 27,226 at 9,103 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 1972).
46. Goldstein v. United States, 201 Ct. Cl. 888 (1973).
47. Id.; Temple Univ. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
48. 20 C.F.R. § 405.499g(e) (1974), as amended, 20 C.F.R. § 405.1885 (1975).
49. Wilson Clinic & Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross, 494 F.2d 50, 56 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974)
(Boreman, J., dissenting). (These facts noted by Judge Boreman are not mentioned in the
majority opinion.)
50. Columbia Heights Nursing Home & Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 280 F. Supp. 1066
(M.D. La. 1974).
51. Id.
52. If categorized as a reliance estoppel exception to the general rule allowing reopenings,
[Vol. 30:427
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3. JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS TO REVIEW COST DISPUTES
Given the large sums of money involved and the due process
errors and omissions of HEW and its intermediaries detailed above,
it is imperative that providers have the access to the courts which
the Secretary has continually sought to deny them. 3 Fortunately,
it is now settled that court review may be obtained even in situa-
tions where the Medicare Act does not expressly provide for it, 4 as
long as the claim falls within the scope of federal question jurisdic-
tion" or is reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act."
Section 205(h) of the Social Security Act 7 is not a bar to review in
those situations.6 Apparently Congress did not originally contem-
plate that HEW and the providers would become involved in cost
disputes of the dollar dimensions discussed here. 9
Only in those situations usually involving individuals, where
Columbia can he harmonized with the majority of cases holding that there is authority to
reopen cost reports. See text, section 1, A, 1 supra.
53. See cases cited note 58 infra.
54. Id.
55. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and arises under the Consti-
tuion, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
56. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
"IFlinal agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [is] subject
to judicial review." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). "This chapter applies . . . except to the extent
that-(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970). Though no law prevents doctors or hospitals from
suing the Secretary of HEW in state court, federal court would seem to be the preferred forum
because of the federal judiciary's familiarity with the Administrative Procedure Act and the
potential practical difficulties of enforcing a state court's order against an agency of the
federal government.
57. Social Security Act § 205 (h), 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970) provides:
The findings and decisions of the Secretary after a hearing shall be binding upon
all individuals who were parties to such hearing. No findings of fact or decision
of the Secretary shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental
agency, except as herein provided.
See text accompanying note 60 infra. This section is incorporated into the Medicare Act by
42 U.S.C. § 1395 ii (Supp. III, 1973).
58. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973);
Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1971); Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger,
376 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975);
Temple Univ. v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 361 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
59. This is evidenced by the fact that Congress amended the Act to provide for express
court review of cost disputes. 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (Supp. III, 1973). See text section III, B, 1
& 2 infra. The statutory silence remains as to court review of coverage disputes between
providers and intermediaries. See text section IV infra.
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the Act establishes explicit review procedures, does section 205(h)
bar the use of alternative means of review."' The circuits are in
general agreement that suits against the Secretary, not specifically
provided for under the Act, are not barred by the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity."1
B. Statutory Amendments
The courts have protected providers during the reopening pro-
cess by permitting judicial review of HEW's actions and by enforc-
ing providers' constitutional rights to due process. Congress has also
created a procedure which will help to insure HEW's responsible
conduct during cost determination reopenings.
In October 1972, Congress, adding section 187812 to the Medi-
care Act, established a Provider Reimbursement Review Board
(PRRB) which, for the first time, provides a non-carrier-based, and
therefore relatively neutral, forum for hearings on cost determina-
tion disputes where the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Fur-
thermore, in an additional 1974 amendment to section 1878, Con-
gress expressly provided for judicial review of any final decision of
the PRRB. ' In January 1975, the PRRB began hearing cases arising
from cost periods ending on or after June 30, 1973.
C. Revised Hearing Regulations: HEW's Positive Response to
Judicial and Congressional Guidance
In October 1974, HEW adopted new regulations 4 covering cost
determinations and reopenings, as well as hearings by the PRRB.
These regulations represent a generally positive response by HEW
to judicial criticism of its past conduct and to the statutory guid-
ance of Congress. Section 405.1885 of the regulations provides that
60. Aquavella v. Richardson, 437 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir. 1971).
61. Kingsbrook Jewish Medical Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973);
Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd on other
grounds, 517 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1975).
62. Medicare Act, § 1878, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (Supp. III, 1973).
63. Pub. L. No. 93-484, § 3 (Oct. 26, 1974), cited in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1674-75.
64. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1801-.1889 (1975), superseding 88 405.490-.499 (1974) which were
criticized by the court in St. Jude Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Richardson, 3 CCH MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID GUIDE 1I 27,226 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 1972). See note 45 supra and accompanying
text. For a discussion of these regulations and a thorough treatment of the cost area see
Homer & Platten, Medicare Provider Reimbursement Disputes: An Analysis of the Adminis-
trative Hearing Procedures, 63 GEO. L.J. 107 (1974).
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no cost report may be reopened after 3 years from the date of origi-
nal determination."5 Review by the PRRB and the courts is expli-
citly provided for disputes over reopenings of cost determinations. 6
Further, the carrier has been made a party to all PRRB hearings,
so that an adjudication in favor of a provider will be binding on the
carrier. 7
The new regulations will pose some difficulties, however. Since
they were written before section 1395oo of the Medicare Act was
amended in 1974, the regulations conflict with'1395oo's expanding
judicial review provisions. Regulations6 limiting judicial review to
situations where the Secretary has modified a PRRB decision ad-
versely to the provider, are now without statutory authority, since
any adverse decision of the PRRB or the Secretary may now be
reviewed as provided by amended section 1395oo.
Another difficulty arises with section 405.1885(c) which states:
"Jurisdiction for reopening a determination or decision rests exclu-
sively with that administrative body that rendered the last determi-
nation or decision."" This regulation could be used in an attempt
to prevent a provider from obtaining court review of a carrier's or
the PRRB's refusal to reopen a cost determination unfavorable to
the provider. The best answer to such an argument is that there is
no statutory basis for such a regulation and it is therefore void.70
In the cost area, then, hospitals and doctors have fought for and
won judicial and congressional protection of their due process rights
vis-a-vis HEW, especially their right to court review of its actions.
The field has now become reasonably stable and fair for the health
care industry. Although recoveries of cost overpayments continue,
HEW has been forced to respect the rights of providers during the
recovery process.
IV. RETROACTIVE RECOVERY OF COVERAGE OVERPAYMENTS
While cost determinations pertain to the efficient delivery of
65. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1885(e) (1975). This 3-year limit applies to any reopening action
undertaken after May 27, 1972.
66. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1889 (1975).
67. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1843 (1975).
-68. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.1871-.1875, .1877 (1975).
69. 20 C.F.R. § 405.1885(c) (1975).
70. Id. The court in Kingsbrook held that the Secretary must reopen a cost determina-
tion for the provider because the Medicare Act required that it do so. There is nothing in the
new amendments (section 1395oo) that changes this, or that precludes direct court review of
whether a regulation is without statutory authority.
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medical services, coverage (medical necessity) determinations ad-
dress a patient's initial need for the service. The providers face, in
the coverage area, critical statutory construction and procedural
issues, similar to those discussed above pertaining to cost: whether
the Medicare Act allows reopenings of past coverage determina-
tions; whether it permits judicial review of HEW's coverage deci-
sions; and what specific due process safeguards providers and doc-
tors may claim as a matter of right. Additionally, coverage determi-
nations intrude upon the practice of medicine to a far greater extent
than do cost determinations. This intrusion creates an additional
vital issue as to what constitutes the allowable extent of federal
control of the practice of medicine.
Although coverage issues are similar to cost issues, the
mechanics are somewhat different. First, doctors who receive pay-
ment under part B of the Medicare Act, as well as providers who
receive payment under part A, are subject to coverage determina-
tions,7 whereas cost decisions apply only to institutions. Secondly,
direct cost determinations are regularly made only once a year,
while direct coverage determinations review the circumstances of
each individual patient's treatment."
These mechanical differences, as well as the difference between
the subject matter of coverage determinations (medical necessity)
and that of cost determinations (efficient delivery), have resulted in
variations in the development of statutory and case law in each
area. Additionally, the continuing conflict over increasing federal
control over the practice of medicine has kept coverage law unset-
tled.
A. Judicial Developments
Coverage case law has focused on statutory construction as the
courts have struggled to decide two issues: (1) Does the Medicare
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (Supp. I1, 1973).
72. In contrast to this direct review, large numbers of coverage determinations for a
particular provider can be reopened indirectly by a statistical sampling method. If a statisti-
cally valid sample of patient confinements shows an average overpayment, this average can
be generalized to each and every confinement in the group from which the sample was taken.
For instance, a carrier, considering 400 cases of confinement for diagnosis "X", reviews the
medical records of 15 of the cases in detail. The reviewer determines that each of the 15
patients in the sample received an average of two unnecessary electrocardiograms. Each of
the 400 cases is then considered overpaid by the cost of two electrocardiograms. Statistical
sampling was used in the Mount Sinai case, discussed in the text following note 73 infra.
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Act bar or allow retroactive coverage reopenings? (2) Does the fact
that doctors are paid under part B of the Act operate to deny them
access to judicial review of HEW's actions? Due process issues are
also raised in the coverage cases, but the courts in deciding these
cases refer to the due process holdings of the cost cases.
1. COVERAGE REOPENINGS ARE NOT BARRED BY STATUTE
The major case on the issue of whether reopenings of coverage
determinations are allowed is Mount Sinai Hospital, Inc. v.
Weinberger.' :' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the dis-
trict court, held that the Medicare Act, rather than abrogating the
government's common law right to recoup payments mistakenly
made for unnecessary services, specifically recognizes that right in
certain of its provisions. 4
This author believes that the circuit court's holding properly
determines that the Medicare statute contains no bar to recovery.
The district court had found such a bar within section 1395y(a),
which provides that "no payment may be made. . . for any expen-
ses incurred for items or services . . . which are not reasonable and
necessary .... "I' This interpretation, however, was too heavy a
strain to put on these words, which are routinely found in the "ex-
clusions" section of private group health insurance policies.
Though the district court's result was not logically supportable,
it was an attempt to remedy the inherent unfairness caused by
recoupment of large sums of money after long periods of time, im-
pairing the hospital's ability to continue to provide its full range of
services. The circuit court realized the harsh effect of its reversal,"6
but offered no hope for mitigation. Future courts, confronted with
recoupments, however, should realize that although a fair result
cannot be attained through statutory construction as the district
court had attempted in Mount Sinai, such equitable doctrines as
estoppel, unclean hands, and laches may be employed to mitigate
any inequities that would result from attempted coverage overpay-
ment recoveries.
73. 376 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Fla. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 571 F.2d 329 (5th Cir.
1975). Szekely v. Florida Medical Ass'n, 517 F.2d 345 (1975), a companion case which reaches
the same result as the Mount Sinai case, also employs the same reasoning. Mount Sinai
applies to providers and Szekely to doctors.
74. Mount Sinai Hosp., Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 329, 345 (5th Cir. 1975).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (1970).
76. Mount Sinai Hosp. Inc. v. Weinberger, 517 F. 2d 329, 338 n.30 (5th Cir. 1975).
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2. DOCTORS' ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COVERAGE REOPENINGS
Does the judicial review provision of the Medicare Act,7" dis-
criminate against doctors, denying them the same access to the
courts as that given to hospitals? The provision (section 1395ff)
deals only with an individual patient's right of review, but the
courts have considered that section germane to the issue of a doc-
tor's right to judicial review of coverage reopenings.
Individual patients have an express statutory right to court
review of any part A benefit determination in which the amount in
controversy after the administrative hearing is $1,000 or more.7"
Individual patients have no right to court review of a part B benefit
determination regardless of dollar amount, although they are al-
lowed an administrative hearing. 9 There is clear, convincing evi-
dence of legislative intent to preclude a "person" from taking a
dispute over part B benefits to court. The policy is to "avoid over-
loading the courts with minor matters,"' " because the average part
B total benefit is often well under $1,000.
Because of HEW's attempts to apply this clearly patient-
directed discrimination under part B to doctors, a doctor faces an
additional burden (above and beyond that encountered by part A
providers) in gaining access to the court whenever HEW attempts
to recoup tens of thousands of dollars of alleged coverage overpay-
ments from him. Congress in 1965 (and probably in 1972) did not
contemplate that coverage disputes of this magnitude would occur
between HEW and part B practitioners.' Clearly, however, sums of
this magnitude are not "minor matters." The intent of Congress,
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (Supp. III, 1973) provides in part:
(b)(1) Any individual dissatisfied with any determination . . .as to-
(C) the amount of benefits under part A of this subchapter . ..shall be
entitled to a hearing thereon by the Secretary
.. .and to judicial review of the Secretary's final decision after such hearing
Section 1395ff is silent as to a determination under part B.
78. Id.
79. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.801 et seq. (1974).
80. Bohlen v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 918, 924-25 (3d Cir. 1973) (Aldisert, J., dissenting),
quoting 118 CONG. REC. 33991-92 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bennett which indicated the
legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff (Supp. III, 1973).
81. [Tihe legislative history . .. does suggest that Congress did not provide
review "of a determination concerning the amount of benefits under part B
[because such] claims will probably be for substantially smaller amounts than
under part A." 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1995.
483 F.2d at 921 n.12.
[Vol. 30:427
MEDICARE
cited above, applies to individual claimants and probably to doctors
or suppliers appealing one claim at a time. It should not apply to a
doctor who has just been tapped for a refund of an alleged overpay-
ment of $150,000.
The cases, though not in agreement, tend to support the propo-
sition that section 1395ff does not deny doctors access to court when
large sums of money are involved. Szekely v. Florida Medical
Association"2 states simply that the court acquires jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)8 ' and 5 U.S.C. § 70211 and that 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(h) is no bar to a suit by a doctor when HEW is attempting
to recover coverage overpayments from him. Additionally, under
Szekely sovereign immunity is no bar to a suit against the Secretary
of HEW under the Larsen-Dugan officer suit exception to the sover-
eign immunity bar."
Canterbury Medical Associates, Inc. v. Richardson86 takes a
more modest approach. Although the court decided that review was
available on grounds no longer applicable due to the 1972 amend-
ments, the court also stated a promising alternative theory: Even if
practioners were first forced to participate in agency hearings, 7 sec-
tion 1395ff of the Act does not on its face provide the clear and
convincing evidence of intent to preclude judicial review required by
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner."5
82. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE 27,105 (S.D. Fla.
July 11, 1974) rev'd on other grounds, 517 F.2d 345 (1975) citing Kingsbrook Jewish Medical
Center v. Richardson, 486 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1973).
83. See note 55 supra.
84. See note 56 supra.
85. [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE 27,105 at 10,591.
The district court noted:
Since the thrust of the plaintiff's challenge concerns the legal authority of the
Secretary to reopen previously paid claims, the case at bar comes within the
Larson-Dugan "officer suit" exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce
Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that an
"officer suit" is maintainable if the averments in the complaint are affirmative
and explicit. Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 770-71 (5th Cir. 1969). The relief
sought, cessation of the suspension order, does not offend Larson's admonition
regarding relief requiring affirmative government action since the government
routinely distributes medicare funds due to individual enrollee-beneficiaries ab-
sent an assignment being made.
86. 11973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE 26,704 (D. Mass.
Mar. 27, 1973).
87. As provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.801 et seq. (1974).
88. 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). In Canterbury, the Court noted:
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Even Russi v. Weinberger," which forced a doctor back to a
part B administrative hearing for a determination on the merits of
the suspension of payments, implies that judicial review will not be
denied, provided administrative remedies must have been
exhausted. The implication arises from the court's statement that
the plaintiff's claim, which did not raise allegations of due process
violations, was not sufficient to by-pass agency review. All of these
cases, including Russi, permit judicial review of due process ques-
tions arising in part B determinations without any requirement that
administrative remedies be exhausted first.
B. Statutory Amendments: Artfulness and Dissonance
The courts have served providers' and doctors' legitimate finan-
cial and due process interests in the medical necessity area, at-
tempting to bar recoveries of coverage overpayments and assuring
access to judicial review of HEW's actions. Congress, on the other
hand, while apparently moving, perhaps with some success, to pro-
tect these same interests, exacts as its price, the ever increasing
control of the practice of medicine.
1. PSRO'S: OUTSIDE THE REALM OF AGENCY EXPERTISE?
The cause of Congress' dissonant approach to medical necessity
problems is clear: HEW must exercise control over medical necess-
ity, yet HEW is forbidden to control it. On the one hand, determina-
tions of what constitutes medically necessary care are inextricably
bound up with decisions concerning the manner in which doctors
practice medicine; the government pays the doctor, so the govern-
ment has the ability to set conditions on its payment. On the other
hand, the first sentence of the Medicare Act reads:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize any
Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control
over the practice of medicine or the manner in which medical
services are provided .... o
Thus, in light of the strong presumption of reviewability that has developed in
the law, it is certainly less than clear that a grant of review under particular
foreseeable circumstances is tantamount to a denial of review as to other less
favorable circumstances.
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE 26,704 at 9,356 n.4.
89. 373 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Va. 1974).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. III, 1973).
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The pre-PSRO system of determining medical necessity, which
is still in operation, is a largely imperfect program. Staying barely
within the spirit of the above cited statutory prohibition against
interference, carriers hire doctors and nurses as full-time employees.
These captive practitioners make medical necessity determinations
on whatever claims are brought to their attention by non-medical
employees. Because many medical necessity issues can be missed
under this system when the claim is originally paid, the spectre of
reopening and review of large numbers of a doctor's or hospital's
past claims looms whenever, by chance, that doctor or hospital has
been brought to the carrier's special attention.
Against this background, Congress passed legislation in 1972
enabling the establishment of a nationwide network of local Profes-
sional Standards Review Organizations, 9 manned entirely by li-
censed practicing local physicians, which will make coverage deter-
minations for each patient before and during each confinement.
Although the PSRO's superficially seem to increase doctors'
self-determination of the parameters of the practice of medicine,
they, in fact, tighten federal control by centralizing nationally the
norms under which local doctor groups must make their pre-
confinement coverage determinations.92 Pre-confinement review,
however, would have a positive effect assuming no bureaucratic
snarls are created. It would largely eliminate the need for reopenings
and recoveries of coverage payments because the initial decisions on
coverage will have been made carefully by qualified personnel and
moneys will no longer be paid erroneously to the extent they now
are.
As a failsafe device to allow recovery of the potentially much
smaller amounts of money it may pay in error, a PSRO will have
the limited power to recover up to $5,000 from a doctor or hospital.
In the alternative, it may suspend a doctor or a hospital from parti-
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (Supp. III, 1973.) establishes Professional Standards Review Organ-
izations (PSROs).
92. Where the actual norms of care . . . in [an] . . . area are significantly
different from professionally developed regional norms of care . . . the [local
PSROI . . . concerned shall be so informed, and . . . the [local PSRO] . . .
may apply such norms in such [local] area as are approved by the National
Professional Standards Review Council.
42 U.S.C. § 1350c-5(a) (Supp. 111, 1973).
Each [local PSROI . . . shall utilize the [regional] norms developed under this
section as a principal point of evaluation and review . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-5(c) (Supp. III, 1973).
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cipation in the Medicare program if, after warning, unnecessary
treatment of patients continues." Since suspension from the pro-
gram is as severe a penalty as paying back large sums of money
previously received, PSRO's merely replace the possibilities of ex-
tensive coverage reopenings with another equally unpleasant possi-
bility. The net gain to the doctor or hospital is that the PSRO
sanctions are accompanied by the explicit due process safeguards of
warning, notice and an absolute statutory right to hearing and judi-
cial review of any suspension or limited recovery actions. 4
Until a local PSRO is fully functional, however, its penalties
and its limited authority to reopen coverage, by the terms of section
1320c-2, are not operative."5 The process of establishing PSRO's is
a slow one. Although they were authorized in 1972, it will be 1977
or 1978 before a majority of them are operating provisionally and
1980, at the earliest, before most of them will be in permanent
operation with the full responsibilities and powers envisioned by
section 1320c. This timetable could be lengthened further by dis-
putes within local medical communities and between organized
medicine and HEW.9" Many segments of the medical profession are
resisting the implementation of PSRO's because they realize that
PSRO's will represent a de facto tightening of federal control over
medical practice. 7
Because PSRO's and their sanctions are not yet a reality, it is
necessary to look at another section of the 1972 amendments which
has the present capacity to affect reopenings and recoveries of cover-
age overpayments.
2. SECTION 1395PP: CONTROLLING MEDICAL NECESSITY WHILE SEEMING
NOT TO
Congress, in 1972, knew that the PSRO's would not be opera-
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
94. Id.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-2 (Supp. III, 1973).
96. The Supreme Court recently upheld, over the challenge of the Association of Ameri-
can Physicians and Surgeons, the PSRO system to review the treatment of Medicare patients.
Association of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. Mathews, 96 S. Ct. 388, aff'g mem. 395 F. Supp.
125 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
97. The PSRO amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (Supp. III, 1973) is a portion of subchapter
XI of the Social Security Act. The Medicare Act is subchapter XVIII of the Social Security
Act. Therefore, the PSRO amendment is technically not subject to the Act's prohibition
against federal interference with the practice of medicine. See note 90 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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tional for some time and that medical necessity disputes needed
some current statutory direction. Yet it remains to be seen whether,
at that point, Congress contemplated the massive retroactive cover-
age reopenings and denials which took place subsequent to 1972.
Section 1395pp,1 promulgated to fill the time gap, has the capacity
to ease the burden on doctors and hospitals which results from
massive reopenings of medical necessity determinations. It also op-
erates to bring the practice of medicine more directly under the
control of HEW and may restrict court review of HEW's medical
necessity determinations and attempted recoupments of coverage
overpayments.
The stated purpose of the section is to reduce the adverse effect
on practioners and providers of agency determinations which disal-
low reimbursements for services which were not covered under the
Act because they were not necessary. Section 1395pp is elliptically
entitled: "Payment for . . .services notwithstanding . . .[their]
disallowance." The import of this section is that providers will be
paid anyway if they "did not know and could not reasonably have
been expected to know"' ' at the time services and items were pro-
vided that these measures would be disallowed as not reasonable or
necessary. Regulations effective as of February 5, 1975,' 1 list the
criteria for determining whether there was knowledge at the time
services were rendered that they would be disallowed. The criteria
include a presumption of no knowledge,'"' which may be rebutted
by evidence that a provider or practitioner had been informed that
the same or similar services were not covered. The presumption may
also be rebutted as to providers by evidence showing that the provi-
der does not regularly comply with the following administrative
criteria: I'll
1) Proper utilization review as set out in section 405.1035;
2) Timely billing;
98. 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp (Supp. III, 1973).
99. Note, in contrast, that by virtue of the PSRO amendment, federal control is exercised
over medicine, not through the existing HEW bureaucracy, but through a National Profes-
sional Standards Review Council, a body of eleven doctors not otherwise in the employ of the
United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-12 (Supp. III, 1973). It is somewhat more legitimate for this
body of doctors to be the instrument of centralized medical control than it is for HEW to
exercise that control directly through its lay bureaucrats.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395pp(a) (1)-(2) (Supp. III, 1973).
101. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.195, 405.330-.332 (1975).
102. 20 C.F.R. § 405.332(b) (1975).
103. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.195, .332(b)(3) (1975).
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3) Prompt notice to attending physicians of utilization deci-
sions; and
4) A past coverage denial history of less than five per cent of
total yearly services provided.""
However, even if the above administrative criteria have been met,
and even if the provider or doctor has not been informed, he will still
be deemed to have knowledge if it is "clear and obvious" that the
provider should have known that the disputed services were not
covered. ''ll
IThe actual effect of section 1395pp's "limitation on liability
mechanism" is to put a non-medical label (that of "prior knowl-
edge") on medical necessity issues. By handling medical necessity
determinations in such a manner that only non-medical questions
are asked, the HEW-carrier bureaucracy has effectively increased
its control of these medical necessity determinations and of the
entire medical necessity area.
It remains to be seen, however, just how HEW will attempt to
use the statute; whether the Secretary will apply it only to single
claims as they are initially reviewed, or whether attempts will be
made to apply it retroactively, (which will raise reopening prob-
lems) either to single claims or to massive reopenings of past claims
already paid to a single provider or practitioner. The language of the
new regulations would seem to indicate a single claims application
in that each individual patient is to be a party to any proffered
review of a determination made under 1395pp.'" Apparently also,
the action taken on this single claim basis may be either prospective
or retroactive. Section 405.704(B) of the January 6, 1975, regulations
indicates that an initial determination as to an individual enrollee
includes a determination of any prior HEW overpayment. Section
405.331(B) states that under certain circumstances an overpayment
to a provider for the benefit of an individual patient can be recouped
from the provider.
If HEW applies 1395pp with the desire to benefit providers and
104. Part A Intermediary Letter No. 73-42 (Oct. 1973) gives the 5 percent figure; it is
not found in the published regulations. Note that under this 5 percent figure, even Mount
Sinai Hospital, which received $22 million a year in Medicare funds and which has had $6
million of its claims denied over a 6-year period, (although not yet recovered) meets the
criteria to be held not to have knowledge.
105. 20 C.F.R. § 405.332(b)(4) (1975).
106. 20 C.F.R. § 405.704 (1975).
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practitioners by more frequently finding "no knowledge," it will
reduce the confusion and uncertainty in the coverage area. If 1395pp
is applied in a hard line manner even to single claims, however, it
will increase the confusion and conflict already present regarding
reopenings. Furthermore, the combination of such a hard line ap-
proach with the attempted application of 1395pp and its regulations
to the mass retroactive coverage denials experienced by the plain-
tiffs in Mount Sinai, Szekely, Russi and Canterbury,'7 would com-
pound the problems.
The new regulations promulgated under 1395pp do not address
clearly the problem of reopenings of coverage determinations on a
mass scale (i.e., all the claims for one doctor for a four-year period).
However, HEW might still attempt to apply 1395pp to retroactive
coverage reopenings since no clear statutory language exists to pre-
vent this approach. Regulations providing for the suspension of cur-
rent payments to recover past overpayments have been in effect
since 1972.11 Current payments could be suspended under these
regulations, and the doctor or provider could be tied up for months
in 1395pp administrative hearings in which he might be permitted
to argue only whether he knew in advance that his claims might be
denied as medically unnecessary. At the least, an extra issue to
litigate has been added. A provider might not be able to get to court
on the medical necessity issue until he has exhausted administra-
tive remedies on the related issue of knowledge. Further, a doctor
might not be able to get to court on any issue because 1395pp pro-
vides no court review for part B administrative hearings on knowl-
edge.
A provider or doctor would argue against such a limitation on
judicial review on the basis that the administrative hearings provide
remedies only on the issue of knowledge. Since he is coming to court
on a different issue, medical necessity, and the administrative hear-
ings cannot provide the remedy he seeks (they cannot decide ques-
tions of medical necessity) he should not be required to submit to
them first. The difficulty with this approach is that if the knowledge
issue is decided in his favor, he would not need to have the medical
issue resolved. In any event the courts should not be denied to part
107. By the same token, a generous application of section 1395pp to retroactive coverage
reopenings would preclude HEW's recovery from providers and doctors and so would reduce
uncertainty and unfairness in this area.
108. 20 C.F.R. §§ 405.370-.373 (1974).
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B physicians after they have submitted to the hearings, since the
restrictions imposed by Congress on judicial review of part B deci-
sions were intended only to avoid burdening the courts with claims
involving minimal amounts. In addition, 1395pp seeks only to pre-
vent doctors from taking single claims to court from the knowledge
hearings. If, however, HEW elects to find the provider or physicians
without knowledge most of the time, 1395pp could be a positive
force for eliminating the inequities previously caused by massive
coverage reopenings and suspensions.
In summary, section 1395pp raises at least as many questions
as it answers. Whether it will cause doctors and hospitals more or
less difficulty will depend on how HEW applies it. It seems certain
that, regardless of its other effects, it will increase HEW's control
over the doctors' practice of medicine.
Viewing the state of the law in the coverage area, it seems that
no trend is as discernible as that of increasing federal supervision
and control of the practice of medicine. Recovery of coverage pay-
ments may or may not be barred and PSRO's may or may not come
to pass. But the most encouraging sign is that, as in the coverage
area, doctors and hospitals have carved out a permanent access to
the courts and the courts are admirably fulfilling their traditional
role, guarding the health industry's due process rights.
V. CONCLUSION
By perseverance and a willingness to fight, hospitals have won
recognition of their right to due process protections when faced with
administrative attempts to recoup cost overpayments. Continued
efforts by hospitals and doctors in the courts could well result in the
same due process protections being extended when coverage ques-
tions are involved.
Doctors and hospitals should not forget, however, that these
protections may also be obtained through legislative action. While
it is true that the courts have generally been more receptive to
requests for these basic protections, an effort should be made to seek
the following statutory protections:
1. Express Statutory Right of Review
A provider or doctor should have an express statutory right to
judicial review on any matter in which the amount in controversy
exceeds $10,000. It is probable that this has not occurred because
Congress is loath to give an express right of judicial review for any
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matter unless it also provides for a prior agency review of that mat-
ter, which prevents court determinations of factual questions. If this
is Congress' rationale, the jurisdiction of existing agency hearing
bodies could be expanded to include review of any matter arising
under the Medicare Act subject to minimum dollar limits. Although
this problem has been substantially solved for cost reopening prob-
lems, it remains for coverage problems.
2. Statutory Three-Year Limitation on Retroactive
Reopenings
This limit already exists for costs. It should be expressly ex-
tended to coverage reopenings as they are applied to providers and
practicioners.
3. Statutory Dollar Limits on Retroactive Recoveries of Both
Cost and Coverage Overpayments
Suspension of current payments to recoup past cost or coverage
overpayments should not be permitted regardless of fault'9 (short
of fraud) when such suspension could cause a provider or practi-
tioner to cease operating or to cease providing a substantial portion
of its services; suspensions not having this effect could be allowed.
The best reason for this recommendation is that no medical service
entity which enters an agreement with HEW, as provided in section
1395cc(a) for providers and in section 1395a(3)(b)(ii) for practition-
ers or suppliers, should be required to risk economic annihilation as
a condition of association.
As discussed earlier in this article, judicially encouraged con-
gressional deliberations have resulted in legislation which provides
an adequate structure of due process protection in the cost area of
Medicare law.
The statutory protections suggested above comprise a similar
framework of fairness for the coverage area. While seeking legisla-
tive enactment of these protections, it is also desirable to take a
parallel course of action in the courts so that if Congress does not
act, the suggested statutory framework would be approximated as
closely as possible by the judiciary through case decisions based on
theories of equity.
Doctors, hospitals and their legal representatives should work
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1395gg(c) (Supp. III, 1973).
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before both Congress and the courts to advance the proposition that
the same structure of fairness that exists in the cost area can and
should be quickly implemented for the coverage area. The foregoing
suggestions as to the limits of retroactive recovery comprise the
basic outline of that structure.
